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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-18a1(1)(a); 78A-4-103(2)(j); and Utah R. App. P. 3(a).
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Powell respectfully requests this Court to reverse his conviction based upon
the legal insufficiency of the evidence and/or because of the involved due process
violations. He alternatively seeks a new trial based on erroneous jury instructions.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES, PRESERVATION, AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the court erred in not granting Mr. Powell’s motion for a directed

verdict. Prior counsel preserved the issue by requesting “a motion for a directed verdict”
and a general reference to the lack of surveillance store video footage or the lack of
“additional information . . . that corroborates what these witnesses are alleged to have
seen.” R 491. To the extent that the issue was not preserved in the manner raised on
appeal, Mr. Powell advances the argument under the ineffective assistance of counsel
(“IAC”). “To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
show that trial counsel's performance was deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced
thereby.” State v. Martinez, 2015 UT App 193, ¶ 30, 357 P.3d 27, 33 (citation omitted).
Ineffective assistance of counsel is thought of as an exception to preservation
because a claim for ineffective assistance does not mature until after counsel
makes an error. Thus, while it is not typical exception to preservation, it allows
criminal defendants to attack their counsel’s failure to effectively raise an issue
below that would have resulted in a different outcome. Such a claim can be
brought in a post-trial motion or on direct appeal.
-1-

State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76,23,416 P.3d 443 (citation omitted). In regards to this
Court’s legal review of the sufficiency of the evidence:
We may reverse a verdict “only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the crime for which he or
she was convicted.” At the same time, a review of a sufficiency of the evidence
argument may also present a threshold question of law—of the elements of the
underlying offense. And on that question, of course, our review is non-deferential,
as our interpretation of the terms of the criminal law is ours to make de novo.
State v. Bagnes, 322 P.3d 719 (Utah, 2014) (citations omitted).
2.

Whether counsel’s failure to object to the flawed jury instructions

constituted deficient performance to the extent that it prejudiced Mr. Powell’s right to a
fair trial by inadequately and improperly instructing the jury on the elements of the
offense. See Mvers v. State, 2004 UT 31, ¶ 20, 94 P.3d 211 (“The failure to instruct a
jury with appropriate definitions and elements for the charged offense similarly amounted
to deficient performance by counsel that fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness to the prejudice of the defendant.”). Since prior counsel did not preserve
the issue, the issue is raised under the above IAC standards.
3.

Whether counsel performed deficiently and prejudicially by failing to move

to dismiss the case based on a due process violation for lost or destroyed evidence. See
State v. DeJesus, 2017 UT 22, at ¶ 30 (“due process clause requires the State to preserve
exculpatory evidence from loss or destruction, . . .”). Since prior counsel did not preserve
the issue, the issue is raised under the above IAC standards. In addition, questions of law
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are reviewed under a correction of law standard.
4.

Whether, pursuant to Rule 23B, this Court should remand the case to the

trial court for the entry of non-speculative findings of fact in furtherance of an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. See Utah R. App. P. 23B. Mr. Powell’s motion,
memorandum, and affidavit were filed as separate companion pleadings to the filing of
this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On December 21, 2015 the State filed an Information, charging Steven Norman
Powell with two counts of Lewdness with prior offense, two third degree felonies, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702(2)(b). R. 1-6. On October 3, 2017, the jury
found him guilty on both counts. R. 176-177. On January 8, 2018, the court sentenced
him, inter alia, to two concurrent terms of 0 - 5 years in prison. R. 220-222. Mr.
Powell’s appeal followed. R. 223-228
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of the facts are more fully stated in the body of the briefs, with the
Points therein factually incorporating and cross-referencing essentially the other sections
of the brief. In addition, Mr. Powell submitted separately other facts through his affidavit
in support of his motion for a Rule 23B hearing.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The elements in the jury instructions failed to properly and legally define the crime
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of Lewdness. Elements 3.a. and 3.b., which were listed as alternative options for the jury
to select, incorrectly allowed them to not make a factually finding on the element of age –
an essential ingredient of the offense. The elements instructions also failed to list the
“attempt” language therein, which corresponds to the “intentional” or specific intent mens
rea necessary for the crime. Appellate opinions interpreting the meaning of lewdness or
analogous situations require the defendant’s mental state to be “lascivious,” which was
absent from the circumstances here. A showing of “irregular indulgence of lust” did not
apply to Mr. Powell, a handicapped person incapable of an erection and who was viewed
covering himself up – the complete opposite of a flasher or flaunter of his private areas.
Prior counsel was similarly deficient for not moving to dismiss the case based on
the State’s failure to keep critical video surveillance footage of the involved incidents.
The lost or destroyed DVD evidence provided an independent depiction of what had
actually occurred in the two stores. Through their notes to the court, it was evident that
the jurors had not necessarily accepted at face value the State witnesses’ claims that Mr.
Powell had exposed himself. The jurors’ notes asked details that only the store DVD
could have provided.
Mr. Powell additionally and separately filed a Rule 23B motion, memorandum,
and affidavit in furtherance of his request for a remanded proceeding in order for the trial
court to enter non-speculative findings of fact for subsequent argument on appeal.

-4-

ARGUMENT
POINT I. PRIOR COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT
OBJECTING TO THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS
The jury instructions on lewdness, Instructions 18 & 19, did not accurately
nor completely excerpt the statute’s language for lewdness into the court’s instructions.
Instruction 18 read in pertinent part:
STEVEN NORMAN POWELL is charged in Counts 1 with Lewdness
occurring between October 1, 2014 through October 31, 2014. You cannot
convict him of this offense unless, based on the evidence, you find beyond a
reasonable doubt each of the following elements:
1.

STEVEN NORMAN POWELL;

2.

Intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly performed any of the
following acts:

3.

a.

An act of sexual intercourse or sodomy;

b.

Exposed his genitals, buttocks, anus, or his pubic area;

c.

Masturbated; or

d.

Any other act of lewdness

And did so
a.

In a public place or

b.

Under circumstances which the defendant should have known
would likely cause affront or alarm to another 14 years of age
or older.

R 198-199; Addenda (for Instructions 18 & 19, the elements and language are essentially
identical except for the listed offense date. A copy of the jury instructions are contained
-5-

in the Addenda). For comparison and review, the lewdness statute reads in pertinent part:
(1) A person is guilty of lewdness if the person under circumstances not amounting
to rape, object rape, forcible sodomy, forcible sexual abuse, aggravated sexual
assault, sexual abuse of a minor, unlawful sexual conduct with a 16- or
17-year-old, custodial sexual relations or misconduct under Section 76-5-412 or
76-5-413, or an attempt to commit any of these offenses, performs any of the
following acts in a public place or under circumstances which the person should
know will likely cause affront or alarm to, on, or in the presence of another who is
14 years of age or older:
(a) an act of sexual intercourse or sodomy;
(b) exposes his or her genitals, the female breast below the top of the areola,
the buttocks, the anus, or the pubic area;
(c) masturbates; or
(d) any other act of lewdness.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702(1).
As more fully set forth below, counsel performed ineffectively by not objecting to
the elements instructions on lewdness and by failing to insert the required legal standards
into the instructions to the jury. See Mvers v. State, 2004 UT 31, ¶ 20, 94 P.3d 211 (“The
failure to instruct a jury with appropriate definitions and elements for the charged offense
similarly amounted to deficient performance by counsel that fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness to the prejudice of the defendant.”).
A.

The Elements Instructions Omitted the Element of Age and the Jury was
Improperly Relieved of its Duty to Factually Find that the Act Involved a
Person “14 Years of Age or Older”

Element 3 of Instruction 18 was incorrect. 3.a and 3.b should not have been listed
-6-

in the alternative. R 198-199. If, as allowed in the case at bar, the jury deliberated and
factually found that the alleged act occurred at Walmart, “a public place,” see id., the
jurors may have reached such a verdict without finding the age element. Age matters
under the statute.
Age should have been included as a mandatory element in the Instructions (and not
as an optional element that was listed in the alternative). The 14 years of age demarcation
is not superfluous language. “14 years of age or older” is statutory language expressly
contained in the Lewdness statute, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702(1), but expressly
omitted in the Lewdness involving a child statute. Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702.5. As a
distinguishing element, “under 14 years of age” applies to lewdness involving a child and
that statute imposes greater penalties for the same acts of lewdness when a child was
involved. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702(1) (lewdness is generally a class B
misdemeanor if an act of sexual intercourse is performed “in the presence of another who
is 14 years of age or older”) with Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702.5 (lewdness involving a
child is generally a class A misdemeanor if the same act [of sexual intercourse] is
performed “in the presence of a child who is under 14 years of age”).
“If a fact was by law essential to the penalty, it was an element of the offense.”
Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2154 (2013); id. at 2155 (“The touchstone for
determining whether a fact must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt is whether
the fact constituted an ‘element’ or ‘ingredient’ of the charged offenses”); id. at 2165
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(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“a legislature may not remove from the jury the assessment
of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is
exposed”).
In Mr. Powell’s case, the statute allowed the jury to convict him without finding
that he performed a lewd act “in the presence of another who is 14 years of age or older.”
Under the flawed options available in the Instructions, the jury may have found that he
recklessly performed any other act of lewdness in a public place. R 198-99. The jury was
allowed to ignore the element of age under the flawed alternative options, listed as a
choice between element 3.a or 3.b. The necessary age element, which had to be factually
found here by the jury to be “a person 14 years of age or older,” distinguished the adult
lewdness charge from the same act, which if performed “in the presence of a child who is
under 14 years of age,” would have been a lewdness involving a child charge. Due to the
absence of a mandatory finding on the element concerning age, the Instructions were
impermissibly flawed.
Since the jury did not necessarily and mandatorily have to make a factual finding
on the element of age, it would be improper to speculate on what the jurors’ decisionmaking process may have been or may not have been. Having an alternative option,
which was erroneous and unlawful, was not a permissible option for the jury to consider.
“Because of the erroneous instruction, there is no way of knowing [which interpretation]
the jury found” State v. Pearson, 1999 UT App 220, ¶ 13; Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S.
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57, 58 (2008) (per curiam) (“[a] conviction based on a general verdict is subject to
challenge if the jury was instructed on alternative theories of guilt and may have relied on
an invalid one”); Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 322 (1985) ("Nothing in these
specific sentences or in the charge as a whole makes clear to the jury that one of these
contradictory instructions carries more weight than the other. Language that merely
contradicts and does not explain a constitutionally infirm instruction will not suffice to
absolve the infirmity. A reviewing court has no way of knowing which of the two
irreconcilable instructions the jurors applied in reaching their verdict"); see Pearson,1999
UT App 220, ¶ 12 (citations omitted) (failure to incorporate an instruction that accurately
states the law is prejudicial “[b]ecause ‘[t]he general rule is that an accurate instruction
upon the basic elements is essential’ [and] ‘failure to provide such an instruction is
reversible error that can never be considered harmless’”); State v. O'Bannon, 2012 UT
App 71 ("[a]n error is prejudicial if it tends to mislead the jury to the prejudice of the
complaining party or insufficiently or erroneously advise[s] the jury on the law").
Due to counsel’s ineffective and prejudicial performance in not objecting to and
correcting the elements Instructions, Mr. Powell requests a new trial with properly
worded jury instructions. See Mvers v. State, 2004 UT 31, ¶ 20, 94 P.3d 211 (“The
failure to instruct a jury with appropriate definitions and elements for the charged offense
similarly amounted to deficient performance by counsel that fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness to the prejudice of the defendant.”).
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B.

A Jury Instruction May Not Define A Crime In A Manner Different
Than The Legislative Enactments

The above comparison between the words in the court’s Instructions and the
statutory language reveal additional errors. The statutory clause, “or an attempt to
commit any of these offenses,” was part of the plain language of the lewdness statute but
not part of the court’s element Instructions. R 198-99; cf. Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702(1).
Without the statutory “or an attempt to commit any of these offenses” clause, the specific
intent requirement was omitted from the court’s Instructions. At the very least, the
court’s Instructions did not track the statutory language nor did it accord relevant caselaw
interpretations.
When a charge involves an “attempt” – like the word’s inclusion in the lewdness
statute – an “attempt to commit any of these offenses” encompasses a specific intent
requirement that may not be coupled with a “reckless” standard of proof. State v.
Norman, 580 P.2d 237 (Utah 1978) (“An attempt to commit a crime is an act done with
the intent to commit that crime. . . .”). In other words, a higher mental state like
“intentionally” is required when the attempt statute is used, not recklessly as it was
improperly listed as an alternative mens rea in Mr. Powell’s case. State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d
843 (Utah 1992) (where the court held that the attempt statute required the mental state of
“intent” notwithstanding the State’s arguments to allow lesser mens rea standards; “the
word "intent" as used in paragraph (2) of the attempt statute should be read to mean
‘conscious objective or desire[;]’ This meaning of the word ‘intent’ obviously is
-10-

distinguishable from knowledge of the proscribed conduct or result [or reckless]”).
In Mr. Powell’s elements’ Instructions, the jury was allowed to convict him with
an inapplicable lesser mental state. See R 198-99 (element 2 of the Instructions asked the
jury to find, in the alternative, any one of three mental states: “Intentionally, knowingly,
or recklessly performed any of the following acts”). Pursuant to a statute – which a court
Instruction or counsel may not disregard – the higher mental state of “intentionally” was
the only corresponding mens rea for an attempted crime. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843; State v
Casey, 2003 UT 55, ¶ 33 (amended opinion) (citation omitted) (“in a prosecution for
criminal attempt, where alternative culpable mental states will satisfy the target offense,
but only one is compatible with the attempt statute, the incompatible element must be
omitted from the jury instructions”).
Counsel performed ineffectively and in a prejudicial manner when they failed to
impose a specific intent requirement into the court’s Instructions. Even in the alternative,
allowing the jury to find a lesser mental state like knowingly or recklessly for a specific
intent crime fell short of the statutory mens rea requirement for an attempt offense. See
id.; Mvers v. State, 2004 UT 31, ¶ 20, 94 P.3d 211 (“The failure to instruct a jury with
appropriate definitions and elements for the charged offense similarly amounted to
deficient performance by counsel that fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
to the prejudice of the defendant.”); see generally Points I, II, and III (to avoid repetition,
each Point within the brief is cross-referenced with other Points herein to the extent that
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they apply).
C.

The Specific Intent Requirement is Consistent With Relevant Authority and
Applicable Case Law

In addition to the requirement of not excluding the plain language of a statute from
the court’s instructions to the jury, prior counsel should have specifically requested the
attempt language from the lewdness statute as a lesser included instruction. Doing so
would have more appropriately put the mens rea element in synch with a companion
statute, Lewdness involving a child, Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702.5, and appellate opinions
on the issue relating to the legal insufficiency of the evidence.
1.

A “Reckless” Mental State Does Not Apply to the Involved Charge

The prohibitions contained in the Lewdness involving a child statute are similar
to, and in some instances identical with, the prohibitions in the Lewdness statute. Utah
Code Ann. §§ 76-9-702; 76-9-702.5. Significantly, the legislative protections are greater
when a child is “under 14 years of age.” For persons “14 years of age or older” lewdness
applies only to a public place, Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702, but when a child is “under 14
years of age,” the same acts of lewdness applies to private places and to specified
circumstances not amounting to sexual exploitation of a child:
(1)
A person is guilty of lewdness involving a child if the person under
circumstances not amounting to rape of a child, object rape of a child, sodomy
upon a child, sexual abuse of a child, aggravated sexual abuse of a child, or an
attempt to commit any of those offenses, intentionally or knowingly does any of
the following to, or in the presence of, a child who is under 14 years of age:
(a)

performs an act of sexual intercourse or sodomy;
-12-

(b)
exposes his or her genitals, the female breast below the top of the
areola, the buttocks, the anus, or the pubic area:
(i)

in a public place; or

(ii)

(c)

in a private place:
(A) under circumstances the person should know will
likely cause affront or alarm; or
(B) with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of
the actor or the child;
masturbates;

(d)

under circumstances not amounting to sexual exploitation of a child
under Section 76-5b-201, causes a child under the age of 14 years to
expose his or her genitals, anus, or breast, if female, to the actor,
with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of the actor or
the child; or

(e)

performs any other act of lewdness.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702.5(1) (emphasis added).
For the mens rea, “intentionally or knowingly” is the mental state for the Lewdness
involving a child statute. Id. Conspicuously absent is the “recklessly” mental state when
a child “under 14 years of age” is involved. When a defendant engages in inappropriate
conduct with younger children (under 14 years), more severe sanctions come into play.
Compare Utah Code Ann. (lewdness is generally a class B misdemeanor if an act of
sexual intercourse is performed “in the presence of another who is 14 years of age or
older”) with Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702.5 (lewdness involving a child is generally a class
A misdemeanor if the same act [of sexual intercourse] is performed “in the presence of a
child who is under 14 years of age”).
-13-

Under the Lewdness involving a child statute, a defendant who “recklessly”
engages in unlawful statutory conduct with a child under 14 years of age is not criminally
liable. Only when a defendant “intentionally or knowingly” engages in unlawful statutory
conduct with a child under 14 years of age does he become criminally responsible. Utah
Code Ann. § 76-9-702.5.
Due to the greater protections inherent in a statute involving our youngest children,
it makes little sense to punish a defendant who “recklessly” engages in unlawful statutory
conduct with an adult or a person “14 years of age or older,” see R 198-99 (Instructions
18 & 19), but to not punish a defendant who “recklessly” engages in the same unlawful
statutory conduct with a child under “14 years of age.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702.5.
Arguably the inverse should be true. The lesser culpable mens rea of “recklessly” should
apply when a child under 14 years of age is involved and the defendant recklessly
engages in lewd behavior. But since the Lewdness involving a child statute does not
prohibit “reckless” lewd acts with a child under 14 years of age, the more general and
lesser protected Lewdness statute involving adults or persons 14 years of age cannot
prohibit the same “reckless” lewd act.
In Mr. Powell’s case, the “intentionally or knowingly” mental states from the
Lewdness involving a child companion statute should have been the applicable mens rea
for situations like his that involves adults or persons “14 years of age or older.” At a
minimum, the more culpable mens rea of “intentionally or knowingly” should have been
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the only mental states contained in the court’s Instructions, albeit Mr. Powell continues to
maintain that “intentionally” or a specific intent was the one and only applicable mental
state for his elements instruction due to existing case law. See generally Points I-III.
Prior counsel performed ineffectively and prejudicially when they failed to correct
the elements instructions by inserting the “intentionally or knowingly” mental states from
the Lewdness involving a child companion statute into the applicable Lewdness
instructions for Mr. Powell’s case. See Mvers v. State, 2004 UT 31, ¶ 20, 94 P.3d 211
(“The failure to instruct a jury with appropriate definitions and elements for the charged
offense similarly amounted to deficient performance by counsel that fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness to the prejudice of the defendant.”).
2.

The Lesser Included Offense Should Have Been Requested

In State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983), the court noted the test for
determining the applicability of a lesser included offense including examining whether (i)
the statutory elements of greater and lesser included offenses overlap . . . and (ii) the
evidence provides a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense
charged and convicting him of the included offense.” Baker, 671 P.2d at 159.
As noted previously, the statutory elements of the greater and lesser included
attempt offense are set forth in the plain language of the Lewdness statute. Utah Code
Ann. § 76-9-702(1). In addition, by definition an attempt to complete a greater offense or
the completed offense constitutes a lesser offense. Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(3)(a)
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(“A defense to the offense of attempt does not arise . . . because the offense attempted
was actually committed”).
The evidence provides a rational basis for a verdict acquitting him of the lewdness
charge and convicting him of attempted lewdness. See Points I-III. With no overt
“flashing” misconduct, the evidence does not rise to the stereotypical trench-coat flasher
or streaker situation. Intentionally opening-up-the-coat behavior for anyone and everyone
to see was not the situation in the case at bar. The jury may have instead considered his
clothing situation (pants not buttoned all the way up or his mesh material otherwise
covering his genitals) as “engag[ing[ in conduct constituting a substantial step toward
commission of the crime” and that he either “intend[ed] to commit the crime” or “when
causing a particular result is an element of the crime, he acts with an awareness that his
conduct is reasonably certain to cause that result.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(3)(a)
(attempt statute). Mr. Powell did not dramatize, gesticulate, imitate, or even simulate an
act of lewdness. State v. Piep, 2004 UT App 7, ¶ 9.
The jury also struggled with the State witnesses’ testimony. The jurors’ notes
revealed that despite the witnesses’ testimony, the jury still asked about the video as they
wanted to know the amount of recorded footage time or the angles from which the video
“would’ve showed whether the defendant was exposed or not?” R 483-84. The questions
posed by the jury occurred after Anastasia Rasmussen and Jennifer Holdaway had already
both testified about him being exposed. Not content with the two prosecution witnesses’
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prior and completed testimony, the jury asked the investigating officer who had watched
the video,“How many minutes approximately of surveillance video from ShopKo were
from an angle that would’ve showed whether the defendant was exposed or not?” R 48384. The jury’s questions reflected the importance of the video and the prejudicial impact
of the footage not being preserved to answer the uncertainties lingering in the juror’s
minds.
Following all of the State’s testimonial presentation about the exposure, the jurors
continued to ask about how long the video was or wouldn’t the video have shown
whether the defendant was exposed. R 484. Even after they heard the officer testify
about Mr. Powell’s purported admissions (albeit distinguished on cross-examination as
referring to his thrill seeking incidents in the past), the jury continued to probe for more
evidentiary details or independent corroboration from the video itself. R 484.
In another note to the court, the jurors asked a question that each store video
surveillance footage would have been able to answer: “Distance [of witnesses] to
defendant when penis viewed at Wal-Mart and ShopKo, one of these was from behind
him, clarify, including distance.” R 451. The jurors’ question was at the close of the
testimony by Jennifer Holdaway, the only other eyewitness at the scene. Thus, the second
of two witnesses had both claimed to have seen his penis, but the jurors’ note indicated
that they were still questioning whether to believe them or the extent of the exposure.
The note was not just for a single store incident, it addressed the witness’ viewing of the
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penis at both WalMart and ShopKo. The jurors’ note twice referred to “distance,” which
is often a key factor in determining the level of certainty or the likelihood of being
(in)correct in any identification process.
Prior counsel performed ineffectively and prejudicially by failing by use the
attempt language from the lewdness statute as a basis for a lesser included instruction,
which would have more appropriately put the mens rea element in synch with the
companion statute, Lewdness involving a child, Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702.5, and
authoritative case law.
3.

Lewdness Should Have Been Defined as Lasciviousness and the
“Common-law Sense of the Irregular Indulgence of Lust” Amounted
to Insufficient Evidence for a Conviction

In line with the above issues, if the mens rea was not intentional or a specific intent
offense, counsel performed ineffectively in not expressly requesting the court to instruct
the jury on the definition of lewdness as defined by case law. In State v. Bagnes, 2014
UT 4, the supreme court “reject[ed] the broad notion of lewdness generally encompassing
any act of impropriety. We interpret the statute instead to partake of a narrower notion of
lewdness marked by lasciviousness—in the common-law sense of the irregular
indulgence of lust.” Id. at ¶ 22. For the jury in Mr. Powell’s case, the prosecution
emphasized his thrill-seeking attitude in connection with past allegations of exposure.
Even if true, however, key differences exist between the irregular indulgence of lust and
thrill-seeking. The sexual component relating to the irregular indulgence of lust is
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nothing but a 34 year old distant memory to a paralyzed man in a wheelchair who cannot
maintain an erection. R 461. Moreover, in addition to the lust versus thrill distinction:
A defendant’s internal lust for sexual gratification alone is insufficient to establish
lewdness. The threshold question is whether the defendant’s conduct consisted of
a lascivious act amounting to the virtual exposure of his private parts. Absent any
indication of that, the private realization of a fetishized sexual fantasy alone would
not make his conduct criminal. Finding no evidence of lascivious, virtual
exposure, we reverse Bagnes’s convictions for lewdness involving a child.
Bagnes, 2014 UT 4, at ¶ 28. Trying to cover himself up was not a lascivious act by Mr.
Powell. Sexual gratification was not sought and it couldn’t exist due to his handicap. At
worse, it was thrill-seeking.
In light of Bagnes, the “intentionally” mental state was applicable and the lesser
mental states were not. It would be impossible for a defendant to engage “recklessly” in
the “irregular indulgence of lust.” Id. at ¶ 22. Indulgence equates with intentional
behavior, particularly when it is “irregular indulgence” and even more so when it is the
“irregular indulgence of lust.” Reckless and knowing mental states would both be
inapposite to the “irregular indulgence of lust.”
“To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
show that trial counsel's performance was deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced
thereby.” State v. Martinez, 2015 UT App 193, ¶ 30, 357 P.3d 27, 33 (citation omitted).
Prior counsel should have brought the Bagnes definitions to the attention of the trial court
in order to properly instruct the jury on the narrow definition of lewdness; they should
have submitted the “intentional” mental state as the one and only mens rea for the charged
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offense, and they needed to use the Bagnes definitions to buttress the motion for a
directed verdict. Counsel’s inaction and failure to effectively perform prejudiced Mr.
Powell’s case.
POINT II. THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING THE DIRECTED
VERDICT
A.

Background

In the context of the wide-ranging perceptions of our sexual mores, see Jacobellis
v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (in the obscenity case, the
Justice’s “I know it when I see it” phrase has evolved into a makeshift definition), a
prosecutor’s or jury’s “first-blush” determination of alleged factual conduct falling under
a sexual offense statute does not necessarily make it so. As noted by our supreme court:
Our Victorian past is well behind us. We no longer live in a society where our
style conventions and social mores clamor for head-to-toe cover-up. The opposite
is closer to the truth. Right or wrong, our society roundly tolerates—and often
encourages— ever-less sartorial coverage of the human body. Whether at the gym,
the pool, the beach, or even the public square, we routinely encounter those who
would flaunt or manifest their (heretofore) private parts, including their pubic
regions. And depictions of these sorts of “exhibitions” are peppered across the
pages of our mainstream magazines, catalogs, newspapers, etc. (in print and
online). Purveyors of this material would hardly expect to face criminal charges
for child pornography or sexual exploitation. And if they were so charged, they
could undoubtedly maintain strong constitutional defenses under the Free Speech
and Due Process Clauses. We therefore reject a broad conception of exhibition in
the sense of mere flaunting or manifesting. To avoid the overbreadth and
vagueness problems noted above, we construe the term instead in its more narrow
sense of making the pubic region visible to public perception.
State v. Bagnes, 322 P.3d 719, 726-27 ¶¶ 36-38 (Utah, 2014) (footnote omitted); id. at ¶
33 (“As with lewdness, ‘exhibition’ is defined to encompass a range of meanings . . .
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[a]nd again, a range of contextual cues point in favor of a more limited conception of this
statutory term”). The narrow or limited interpretation of the statutory elements in the case
at bar extend to both a person’s actions and his intent.
As reflected below, prior counsel performed ineffectively in failing to apply the
narrow standards to Mr. Powell’s non-lascivious circumstances. Such legal standards,
which were not addressed with the trial court, should have been part of counsel’s prior
performance and advocacy. Due to the prejudicial nature of the errors, counsel rendered
deficient performance.
B.

Actions That Appear to Satisfy the Plain Language of the Statute May Be
Inadequate Evidence Under Case Law’s Narrow Interpretations

The trial court denied Mr. Powell’s motion for a directed verdict, R 491, although
Mr. Powell submits that on the underlying threshold question of law regarding the
elements of the offense, this Court’s non-deferential review should reach an opposite
conclusion.
We may reverse a verdict “only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the crime for which he or
she was convicted.” At the same time, a review of a sufficiency of the evidence
argument may also present a threshold question of law—of the elements of the
underlying offense. And on that question, of course, our review is non-deferential,
as our interpretation of the terms of the criminal law is ours to make de novo.
State v. Bagnes, 322 P.3d 719 (Utah, 2014) (citations omitted). The sufficiency of the
evidence did not fulfill the threshold question of law.
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1.

Apparent Facial Validity or Seemingly Prima Facie Fulfillment of
the Statute May Not Be Enough

Due to the narrow or limited nature of case law interpretations, what actions
appear sufficient at first-blush as being proscribed by the statute may require a deeper
analysis. State v. Serpente, 768 P.2d 994, 995 (Utah Ct.App.1989) (“In order to give the
statute the implementation which will fulfill its purpose, reason and intention sometimes
prevail over technically applied literalness”). For example, while inappropriate behavior
is not to be condoned, the plain language of the forcible sexual abuse statute was found to
not apply to a juvenile who invited “the complainant to commit an act or oral sex upon
him [and] he forcibly rubbed his hand along her buttocks.” State in Interest of LGW, 641
P.2d 127, 131 (Utah 1982). Under the plain language of the statute, such factually
indecent misconduct seemed to constitute a crime:
A person commits forcible sexual abuse if, under circumstances not amounting to
rape or sodomy, or attempted rape or sodomy, the actor touches the anus or any
part of the genitals of another, or otherwise takes indecent liberties with another, ...
with intent to cause substantial emotional or bodily pain to any person or with the
intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, without the consent of
the other.
LGW, 641 P.2d at 129 (quoting Utah Code Ann. 76-5-404) (emphasis added by the
court)). The juvenile’s conduct did not amount to the greater listed offenses, yet he
certainly took indecent liberties with the complainant through his vulgar words and his
unwanted rubbing along her buttocks. But the appellate court held otherwise:
Construing the term "indecent liberties" in § 76-5-404, this Court held that the
brief touching of clothed breasts did not constitute the felony of forcible sexual
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abuse. "Indecent liberties" included only "conduct of the same magnitude of
gravity" as touching "the anus or genitals of another... ." Under that precedent and
principle, we hold that the touching involved in this case did not constitute the
felony of "taking indecent liberties" as defined in § 76-5-404. If the brief touching
of a clothed breast does not constitute that crime, as we held in J.L.S., supra, we
are unable to see how the brief touching of a clothed buttocks is any more
felonious.
State in Interest of LGW, 641 P.2d 127 (Utah 1982) (construing In State in re J.L.S., 610
P.2d 1294 (Utah 1980)). What appears factually befitting of the statute may not be, as a
legal perspective often differs from an emotional perspective.
2.

Salacious Material in a Book, Which Portrays Sexually Explicit Acts
Listed in the Lewdness Statute, Is Not Lewd As a Matter of Law

In another case, State v. Piep, 2004 UT App 7, 84 P.3d 850 (Utah App., 2004), the
opinion considered whether a father who had provided his child with the book, “Sex Q
and A,” which “had photographs of ‘naked people doing bad things,” amounted to an act
of lewdness. The trial court there (and the State) “reasoned that the material was lewd
because it was salacious which, according to the dictionary definition, means ‘arousing or
appealing to sexual desire or imagination.’ Essentially, the [lower] court determined that
showing the book to J.W. [a minor] was an act of lewdness because the book portrayed
acts listed in the lewdness statute.” Piep, 2004 UT App 7, ¶ 9; see also id. at ¶ 10 (“the
lewdness statute . . . is strikingly similar to the lewdness involving a child statute”).
The statute on lewdness involving a child states, in pertinent part: (1) A
person is guilty of lewdness involving a child if the person ... intentionally or
knowingly does any of the following to, or in the presence of a child who is under
14 years of age: (a) performs an act of sexual intercourse or sodomy; (b) exposes
his or her genitals, the female breast below the top of the areola, the buttocks, the
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anus, or the pubic area...; (c) masturbates; (d) under circumstances not amounting
to sexual exploitation of a child under Section 76-5a-3, causes a child under the
age of 14 years to expose his or her genitals, anus, or breast, if female, to the actor,
with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of the actor or the child; or (e)
performs any other act of lewdness.
Piep, 2004 UT App 7, ¶ 8 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702.5(1).
The book in Piep, “Sex Q and A,” is extremely graphic. In the eyes of the factfinder at trial, there seemed to be ample evidence of lewdness. A public online preview
of the book (i.e. on the website of the online retailer, Amazon, which previewed pages
from the book, including frequently asked questions and answers) were unquestionably
graphic: “How important is nipple stimulation during sex?”; “Should I wait for my
girlfriend to have an orgasm before I ejaculate?”; and “My husband uses a vibrator to
make me orgasm. Could this prevent me from climaxing normally?” The online pictures
within the book, also for public preview, “exposes . . . the female breast below the top of
the areola [and] the buttocks, . . .” In short, the book’s explicit sexual content and
pictures amply supported the lewdness element, as set forth in the plain language of the
statute.
Nevertheless, this Court “fail[ed] to see how showing J.W. a book is a sexual act
covered by the statute. The contents of the book may well appeal to sexual desire or
imagination; but Piep did not dramatize, gesticulate, imitate, or even simulate the acts
covered in the book.” Piep, 2004 UT App 7, ¶ 9. Mr. Powell similarly did not dramatize,
gesticulate, imitate, or even simulate an act of lewdness.
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Importantly, in Piep the crime of lewdness did not apply to the book’s graphic
content and pictures, which fell under the language of the lewdness statute (i.e. “exposes
. . . the female breast below the top of the areola, the buttocks, . . .”) and was available to
a child under 14 years of age for examination or reading by the minor at his or her leisure
and convenience. Whatever social mores underlay the legislature’s lewdness statute were
eviscerated by the explicit content within the book. The book itself, “Sex Q and A,”
detailed even more graphic sexual descriptions and pictures than the public preview
available through Amazon. The availability of the sexually explicit content to a child
seemed particularly concerning.
Substance over form should similarly apply to Mr. Powell’s non-lascivious
situation. If lewdness does not apply, as a matter of law, to a circumstance where a child
under 14 may examine at his or her leisure a book’s sexually explicit questions and
answers (and pictures), then lewdness is even more inapplicable where an adult struggles
to catch Mr. Powell in the act of exposure, but can’t do so even momentarily with a
photograph. See Exhibit 1 (rather than trying to expose himself to others in a blatant
flashing or opening-of-the-trench-coat type exhibition, the photograph by the prosecution
witness showed Mr. Powell trying to cover up and conceal himself). The distinctions in
substance overcome the form arguments to the contrary (e.g. child victim in Piep versus
adults in Mr. Powell’s case; a child’s leisurely ability to review the book in Piep versus an
adult’s momentary glance with Powell and pursuit of him (not his pursuit of the victims);
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the sexually explicit content or pictures in Piep did not have to be concealed versus
Powell tried to avoid exposure as he immediately attempted to cover himself up from
approaching members of the public).
If, on his lap as Mr. Powell was seated in his wheelchair in the store, he had
opened a page of the book, Sex Q and A, (or any medical book) to a picture of a penis or
a breast, such a graphic and clear literary (yet actual) photograph of genitalia or a breast
would seem to be in violation of the lewdness statute (i.e. “exposes his or her genitals, the
female breast below the top of the areola, the buttocks. . . .”). However, just like a
medical student who has an anatomy textbook open to a chapter on reproduction, the
lewdness statute would not subject him or her for such an exposure or exhibition of
private parts. Piep, 2004 UT App 7, ¶ 9 (“We fail to see how showing J.W. a book is a
sexual act covered by the statute”). Such conduct would be obviously inappropriate, but
not necessarily illegal. Id.
3.

“Exposure” Is Not Any and All Exposure

In State v. Serpente, 768 P.2d 994 (Utah App.1989), students testified that a
disgruntled parent, Ms. Serpente, had flashed or mooned a teacher by raising her dress
above her buttocks. Id. In determining whether such an act satisfied the lewdness
standard, the opinion initially rejected the State’s attempt to adopt a broad definition of
the term “exposes,” to include conduct that "directs public attention" to one's genitals or
private parts.
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We interpret the term "exposes" as it appears in § 76-9-702.5, according to its
"plain meaning," because there is nothing within the context of the legislation
which justifies a different interpretation. We turn to Webster's Third New Int'l
Dictionary (unabridged) 802 (1986), wherein "expose" is defined as "to deprive of
shelter, protection, or care ... to lay open to view, to lay bare."
Substituting one of the definitions set forth above for the term "exposes" as
it appears in § 76-9-702.5, the statute would read: "A person is guilty of lewdness
involving a child if the person [makes bare] his or her genitals or private parts."
Furthermore, after a thorough review of cases interpreting indecent exposure
statutes, we are unable to find a single case where a conviction of indecent
exposure did not involve at least partial nudity. Thus, we hold that the phrase
"exposes his or her genitals or private parts" under § 76-9-702.5, is limited to
instances involving at least partial nudity.
The State urges this Court to adopt a more expansive definition of the term
"exposes," to include conduct that "directs public attention" to one's genitals or
private parts. This we are unwilling to do. Given contemporary fashion designs
and revealing swimwear, the State's definition might well subject many
unsuspecting citizens to criminal prosecution for unlawful exposure. Ms.
Serpente's lifting of her dress revealed no bare skin.
Serpente, 768 P.2d 994, 997 (footnotes omitted).
In the case at bar, unlike Ms. Serpente’s lifting of her clothing, the prosecution
witnesses’ testimony indicated that Mr. Powell had tried to cover himself up. This was
the opposite of a “flasher” type situation. See R 439 (as explained by a State witness,
“My speculation was that he grabbed the pants and was clearly looking at us and trying to
cover something when he took the -- when we took the picture”); R 407-08 (“my
impression is that I think he sees us and recognizes us from Wal-Mart, and is clearly
covering himself because he doesn't want pictures of what he's doing”); Exhibit 1. In
contrast to the above definition of expose (“to deprive of shelter, protection, or care . . . to
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lay open to view, to lay bare”), Mr. Powell tried to shelter his private area, to protect
against its exposure, and to keep his genitals closed from view when the witnesses were
near by. He was doing the opposite of what was needed by the statute for exposure.
Mr. Powell may have failed the “directs-public-attention” to onself standard by
being in a wheelchair (which in and of itself draws attention to himself due to his
handicap and not blending in with the walking or standing crowd around him), as he had
his pants unbuttoned or not buttoned to the top, and had a mesh cover over his pant area,
but this Court has already rejected such a expansive “directs-public-attention” standard.
Serpente, 768 P.2d at 997.
Moreover, being “exposed” does not necessarily mean being completely exposed.
See id. As the prosecution witness’ testimony revealed, “nothing” did not necessarily
mean nothing.
Q. [State:] Okay. So you see him coming towards you, and nothing covering.
A. [Ms. Rasmussen] Yep.
Q. Tell me a little bit more about that.
A. What I did see was, like, almost like fishnet stockings that you wear for maybe
a costume, that's what was down there. Very see-through, but, like, holes – like,
not just his zipper down, but, like, full-on nothing covering down there.
Q. Okay. So you keep saying down there.
A. Okay.
Q. I know it's uncomfortable. I'm going to need you to be --
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A. Covering his genitals.
Q. Covering his genitals.
A. Yep.
Q. Okay. So were you able to see his penis?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. So you mentioned a little bit about the -- almost, like, stocking-like
material.
A. Yeah.
Q. Do you remember what else he was wearing?
A. I remember it was, like, a plaid shirt, a baseball cap and jeans.
R 396-97. Her description of “fishnet stockings” is consistent with the other witness’
description of “black mesh covering his [penis.]” R 433. Both women said that black
mesh or fishnet was covering his genitals, R 397, 433, but mesh is not nothing.
In 1977, Cheryl Tiegs, wore a mesh or fishnet swimsuit for Sports Illustrated,
https://www.vanityfair.com/style/photos/2010/05/sports-illustrated-slideshow-201005#2
which caused an uproar because the see-through material showed the nipples on the
model’s breasts. Even though Sports Illustrated is a national publication who had
rewarded Ms. Tiegs’ revealing pose with the sought-after cover page of its magazine,
many subscribers and the public were morally outraged. Cf. State v. Bagnes, 322 P.3d
719, 726-27 ¶¶ 36-38 (Utah, 2014) (“we routinely encounter those who would flaunt or
manifest their (heretofore) private parts, including their pubic regions. And depictions of
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these sorts of ‘exhibitions’ are peppered across the pages of our mainstream magazines,
catalogs, newspapers, etc. (in print and online). Purveyors of this material would hardly
expect to face criminal charges for child pornography or sexual exploitation”); id. (“We
therefore reject a broad conception of exhibition in the sense of mere flaunting or
manifesting”).
Without entering that fray, a key distinction should be noted. The model, Cheryl
Tiegs, willingly exposed herself whereas Mr. Powell did not. Time after time, the
witnesses said he tried to cover himself up. The State’s photograph similarly showed the
same act of concealment. See Exhibit 1.
And just as importantly, Mr. Powell’s Rule 23B factual affidavit indicated that
unlike the gaping see-through holes in Ms. Tiegs’ swimsuit, Walmart employees checked
out Mr. Powell’s mesh material at the scene and determined that his clothing situation did
not constitute a problem for exposure. See Rule 23B Steven Powell Affidavit. In
response to the witnesses’ complaints, security confronted and questioned Mr. Powell,
they checked him out, and they let him go. Id.
Hence, notwithstanding the State’s emphasis at trial on his past thrill-seeking
attitude that being naked underneath was exciting to him, the thought of being naked
underneath in public was still a thrill-seeking thought. State v. Hawker, 2016 UT App
123, at § 14 (“The State’s argument, at first glance, appears to comport with the plain
language of the statute. But such a reading of the statute would create an anomaly by
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criminalizing an intent to engage in noncriminal behavior”); see also Rule 23B Steven
Powell Affidavit (through the Rule 23B proceedings, Mr. Powell moves to suppress his
prior statements to the officer).
The actual act or performance of exposing himself, see Serpente, 768 P.2d at 997
(“to deprive of shelter, protection, or care . . . to lay open to view, to lay bare”), was not
established nor even apparent when a Walmart employee earlier interacted with Mr.
Powell (before the State witnesses had complained) nor later when Walmart security
confronted him in response to and after the State witnesses had complained. See Rule
23B Steven Powell Affidavit. Significantly, at Walmart there were no confrontations
between Mr. Powell and the State witnesses, which means that Walmart employees would
have confronted Powell without him receiving advance notice or absent the opportunity to
cover up his groin area. Catching him in the act did not occur because he had not done
anything wrong and he did not need to hurriedly cover himself because he had not been
exposed during his entire time in Walmart. See Rule 23B Steven Powell Affidavit.
Mr. Powell stated that he was using a catheter, which is consistent with something
– not nothing – precluding his penis from being exposed. R 467 (“He previously
indicated to the officer that “his catheter became kinked, and that he was trying to unkink
it so he wouldn’t end up wetting his pants”); R 467 (“He wrote that he didn’t think
anyone actually viewed him doing it, but that he could be wrong”). Even for the more
blatant exposure allegation, at trial one witness said that she “saw him without his pants
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and a mesh [was] covering over them [his penis].” R 445. A male with his pants
unbuttoned is frown upon in the context of the prim-and-proper witness perception of a
standard dress code. Opened pants, coupled together with a mesh cover over the groin
area, suggested a penis underneath whether it was visible or not. State v. Bagnes, 2014
UT 4, at ¶17 (“a statutory standard turning on subjective assessments of general
impropriety would implicate constitutional concerns. The specific problem here is one of
vagueness [noting that [u]ncertainties about the perimeters of the common-law definition
of lewdness have . . . resulted in some lewdness statutes being held void for vagueness]”);
2014 UT 4, at ¶26 (“If virtual exposure is the question, we cannot deem the public display
of a diaper to qualify unless we are prepared to also criminalize a range of other clothing
that is much less opaque and far less obscuring [such as certain swimwear, or even
athletic or workout attire]. The difference between the former and the latter is social
acceptability—not lasciviousness in the form of virtual exposure”)
4.

Mr. Powell’s Inability to Perform Precludes His Lewdness
Conviction

Not only was Mr. Powell’s inability to have an erection inconsistent with his intent
to expose himself, his flaccid state is also at odds with the accompanying subsections of
the statute. State v. Serpente, 768 P.2d 994, 997 (Utah Ct.App.1989) (applying the
doctrine of ejusdem generis to the phrase "any other act of gross lewdness" because the
phrase "derive[s] its definition from the context in which it appears"); In re A.T., 2001 UT
82 at ¶¶ 8 & 12, 34 P.3d 228 (the doctrine restricts that general term, or "catchall phrase
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at the end of a statutory list of more specific proscribed acts,", to "include things of the
same kind, class, character, or nature as those specifically enumerated, unless there is
something to show a contrary intent.").
In State v. Hawker, 2016 UT App 123, the opinion construed a statute involving
terms similar to the ones in Mr. Powell’s case including the scope of the definitions
relating to sexual intercourse, sodomy, and masturbation:
Like the lewdness statute in Serpente, the sexual solicitation statute must be read to
prohibit receiving or agreeing to receive payment for acts that are of the same sort,
or “of equal magnitude.” The list set forth [in a cross-referenced statute] includes
sexual intercourse, which requires two people to be jointly engaged in the conduct,
and sexual contact between “the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of
another person” —again, necessarily a two-person activity. Neither of these
categories of conduct involves one person acting and another person watching. In
other words, for these types of sexual activity to be prohibited under [the statute],
“with” must mean that the other person is joining in the activity and not merely
there as company or a very small audience. Construing like terms together, “with”
must mean the same when applied to masturbation. It is therefore not enough,
under [the statute], that someone agrees to masturbate on her own for a fee while
another person is present. Because this is precisely what Defendant agreed to do,
her agreement did not violate [the statute]
State v. Hawker, 2016 UT App 123, at ¶ 13.
Since the statutory companion provisions there pertained to sexual activities
involving two-people, the act of masturbation – a one-person activity that the defendant
agreed to do on her own for a fee while another person was present – did not violate a
statute that prohibited her from “agree[ing] to commit that sexual activity with another
person for a fee.” Id. at ¶ 10 (emphasis in original). Masturbating for a person who
would watch but not participate was a one-person activity and not a statutory violation,
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whereas masturbating with another person who would actively participate was a twoperson activity that was against the law. Hawker, 2016 UT App 123
The same type of narrow distinction exists in Mr. Powell’s case. In order to be
found guilty of lewdness, the defendant must perform an act, which is contrary to a
quadriplegic’s inability to “perform” with an un-erect penis. Utah Code Ann. § 76-9702(1)(a), (c), (d). In addition to the “exposure” statutory subsection, the meaning of
which has been narrowed by case law, see generally Points I-III, the lewdness statute
requires a person to perform, or attempt to perform “an act of sexual intercourse or
sodomy”; masturbation; or “any other act of lewdness.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-9702(1)(a), (c), (d). A quadriplegic cannot perform sexually, period. His lack of an
erection eliminates his ability to perform in a like exposed manner of a person performing
an act of sexual intercourse or a person performing an act of masturbation. The trench
coat flasher statutorily “performs” by openly exposing himself in violation of the
lewdness statute, which is also in line with a performer openly having sex. However, the
concealment behavior by Mr. Powell is contrary to the exposure requirement or to
perform the act of exposure. Id.; compare Piep, 2004 UT App 7, ¶ 9 (like Mr. Piep, Mr.
Powell did not dramatize, gesticulate, imitate, or even simulate the acts covered in the
book”); State v. Bagnes, 322 P.3d 719, 727 ¶ 38 (“We therefore reject a broad conception
of exhibition in the sense of mere flaunting or manifesting. To avoid the overbreadth and
vagueness problems noted above, we construe the term instead in its more narrow sense
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of making the pubic region visible to public perception”).
POINT III. COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT MOVING TO DISMISS
THE CASE BASED ON LOST OR DESTROYED EVIDENCE
In State v. DeJesus, 2017 UT 22, the high court reaffirmed a state constitutional
principle “that the due process clause requires the State to preserve exculpatory evidence
from loss or destruction, . . .” Id. at ¶ 30. The burden rests with the prosecution to
preserve exculpatory evidence like videotapes or surveillance DVD’s from loss or
destruction. Id. The DeJesus opinion found that the State’s loss of video footage of the
involved altercation (which constituted the basis of the charged assault offense) warranted
a dismissal of Ms. DeJesus’ case.
In DeJesus, “the State charged Ms. DeJesus with one count of assault under Utah
Code section 76-5-102.5, which provides that ‘[a]ny prisoner who commits assault,
intending to cause bodily injury, is guilty of a felony of the third degree.’” 2017 UT 22, ¶
9. The victim, Correctional Officer Hansen, testified first-hand that inmate Lissette
DeJesus’ had intentionally kicked him or assaulted him during his shift at the prison.
When the officer had tried to break-up a fight between DeJesus and another inmate, “Ms.
DeJesus kicked Officer Hansen twice—once in the abdomen and once in the thigh.”
2017 UT 22, ¶¶ 4-5. The officer’s testimony to the jury about being personally kicked
(twice) by DeJesus in a non-accidental manner was enough to sway the jury (who
convicted DeJesus), yet the supreme court “reverse[d] the district court’s denial of Ms.
DeJesus’s motion to dismiss and remand[ed] for that court to enter an order of dismissal.”
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2017 UT 22, ¶ 55. “[T]he State’s failure to preserve the [prison’s surveillance video]
footage is a severe violation of Ms. DeJesus’s right to a fair trial and dismissal is an
appropriate remedy.” Id. at ¶ 54. The same result should have occurred in Mr. Powell’s
case.
The applicable test, which was previously set forth in State v. Tiedemann, 2007
UT 49, ¶¶ 44–45, was reaffirmed in DeJesus: “[O]nce ‘a defendant has shown a
reasonable probability that lost or destroyed evidence would be exculpatory,’ the
defendant has established that a due process violation occurred.” DeJesus, 2017 UT 22, ¶
45 (quoting State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ¶ 44, 162 P.3d 1106)). Once the reasonable
probability threshold has been satisfied, to determine the seriousness of the due process
violation and to fashion the appropriate remedy, courts must balance both: (1) the
culpability of the State in the loss or destruction of the evidence and (2) the prejudice to
the defendant as a result of the missing evidence. DeJesus, 2017 UT 22, ¶ 45; State v.
Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ¶¶ 44–45.
A.

The “Reasonable Probability” Standard Is A Low Threshold

Unlike the federal standard, which required the defendant to show “bad faith” on
the part of the police to preserve potentially useful evidence, Utah’s state constitutional
due process analysis expressly rejected the federal bad faith requirement. DeJesus, 2017
UT 22, ¶ 24-25; id. at ¶ 31(“rejecting this demanding bad-faith standard”). Instead, Utah
law imposed an admittedly “low threshold” for showing a reasonable probability that lost
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or destroyed evidence would be exculpatory.
Although a “reasonable probability” standard defies a precise definition or
quantifiable value, we have described it as “a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.” And though it is more than a “mere possibility,” it
falls “substantially short of the ‘more probable than not’” standard. Ultimately, in
order to satisfy the reasonable probability standard in the lost evidence context, a
defendant must make some proffer as to the lost evidence and its claimed benefit.
So long as that proffer is not pure speculation or wholly incredible, the standard
will be satisfied.
DeJesus, 2017 UT 22, ¶ 39 (footnotes omitted). Importantly, defendants do not have to
establish that the lost or destroyed evidence was in fact exculpatory. Indeed the DeJesus
opinion corrected the trial court’s determination to the contrary.
Our review of the district court’s determination that Ms. DeJesus failed to satisfy
the threshold reasonable probability requirement leads us to conclude that the court
applied a more stringent standard than the one we just articulated. The court stated
that “[t]here must be something in the evidence before the court . . . that shows the
court there is some reasonable basis on which to believe the recording would show
what defendant claims.” This standard suggests that defendants must provide
evidence that the lost or destroyed evidence was in fact exculpatory. This is too
high of a burden given both the reasonable probability standard articulated in
Tiedemann and the fact that, in many lost evidence cases, there may be little
extrinsic, corroborating evidence. Defendants will likely never be able to fully
establish exactly what the evidence would have shown. Instead, all a defendant
must show is that there is a reasonable probability the evidence would have been
exculpatory.
DeJesus, 2017 UT 22, ¶ 40 (emphasis added). The duty falls squarely on the prosecution:
it is usually inappropriate to permit the State to undermine a defendant’s claim that
there is a reasonable probability that lost evidence would have been exculpatory by
having the State describe what the evidence actually showed. The reasonable
probability threshold inquiry does not involve a balancing of evidence to determine
which side’s story about the lost evidence is more believable and whether the
evidence was in reality inculpatory or exculpatory; it focuses entirely and solely on
whether the defendant can show a reasonable probability that the evidence would
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have been exculpatory. If we were to hold otherwise, the State would be
incentivized to destroy relevant evidence and later claim that the evidence would
have only supported its own version of the events. It is the State’s duty to preserve
relevant evidence, and it cannot escape that duty—or the consequences of its
breach of that duty—simply by putting on evidence as to what the lost evidence
would have shown.
DeJesus, 2017 UT 22, ¶ 44 n. 62 (emphasis added).
B.

Mr. Powell’s Circumstances Satisfied The “Reasonable Probability”
Standard

Mr. Powell’s prior counsel performed ineffectively in not moving to dismiss his
case pursuant to DeJesus and Tiedemann. “To succeed on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that trial counsel's performance was
deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced thereby.” State v. Martinez, 2015 UT
App 193, ¶ 30, 357 P.3d 27, 33 (citation omitted).
The lost evidence and its claimed benefit in Mr. Powell’s case is quite similar to
the DeJesus case. Unlike a tiny “mom-and-pop” corner neighborhood store with scant
resources for security, Walmart and Shopko are established “brick-and-mortar” stores
with sophisticated security surveillance systems in place from above and at multiple
angles from within the store. Their video technology is especially good, as monitoring
acts of theft – and catching defendants in the act – is part of recorded evidence in
misdemeanor and felony cases (and for other incidents like slip-and-fall civil actions) in
courtrooms across the nation. Shoplifting is not an isolated nor infrequent act and
numerous cameras from within the ceilings of the store are used to catch people who
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don’t want to be seen. Mr. Powell’s case went beyond the more likely dated prison
surveillance footage system in DeJesus.
In Mr. Powell’s case, the store’s video footage could even be converted to
photographic still shots. Moreover, the store surveillance was able to zoom in to identify
the man’s face by his goatee and mustache while he was seated in a handicapped
wheelchair and to also enlarge and enhance the clarity of the photograph of his van in the
distant parking lot to the point where the investigating officer could track it down by
identifying its make and model. See Exhibits 2 & 3; R 460.
The benefit of the surveillance footage is apparent given the involved time period
that he remained exposed and the roaming nature of a partially naked man traipsing about
the store in his wheelchair. With him being in numerous sections of the store – his naked
mid-section apparently continuously exposed for the entire duration – at least some store
surveillance footage during a 10 minute (to 30 minute) period of time would have
captured his exposed state at one angle or another for at least a second or more. The
surveillance time period may have extended upwards to a half hour.
Q:

Okay. And once you came into contact with – or once you became aware of
Mr. Powell and then the picture was taken, how long did all of that take?

A:

Oh, I would say no more than a half hour.

R 443.
At Walmart the prosecution witness, Anastasia Rasmussen, testified that she was
“going down to the makeup section . . . and saw him [Powell] coming out of the women’s
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clothing . . . section between all the clothes, he was coming out into the main section.” R
395-96. “When I [Anastasia] look over, nothing covering his genital area.” R 396. She
leaves the area to get her stepmom and aunt. In their attempt to relocate him, he moved
passed the women’s clothing and was now in the jewelry section. R. 399. “[H]e was still
exposed.” R 400. The “whole thing took, from [Anastasia] first noticing Mr. Powell to
then bringing [her] . . . stepmom and aunt . . . [p]robably five, 10 minutes.” R 416.
In Anastasia’s own words, Mr. Powell was in the main section of the store and he
was rolling his wheelchair in areas of high video surveillance including the jewelry
section. This case is not about shoplifters who concealed themselves in a nook or cranny
of the store or who hid in a bathroom to stuff merchandise down their pants. The
witnesses said Mr. Powell was out in the open in main sections of a busy store while his
exposed body parts also remained “out in the open.” Five, ten, or thirty minutes of video
surveillance footage would have recorded a relevant one second frame or captured a
single photographic snapshot of his exposed state from at least one vantage point as he
wheelchaired himself from open area to open area within the store. See DeJesus, 2017
UT 22, ¶ 39 (“a defendant must make some proffer as to the lost evidence and its claimed
benefit. So long as that proffer is not pure speculation or wholly incredible, the standard
will be satisfied”).
The timeline in Shopko was similar. Anastasia Rasmussen was in the children’s
clothing area in Shopko and claimed that she “saw his penis from that vantage point, [like
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20 feet away].” R 419. Anastasia went to get her aunt and brothers. Upon their return
about “10 minutes” later, Powell was then in the men’s department. R 420. He was still
exposed, she testified, because when they photographed him he tried to cover his genitals.
R 420. Ten minutes of continuously playing video surveillance footage would have
recorded at least one second or one angle of his unaltered exposed nakedness as he moved
from one department to other sections within the store. For the video footage in both
Walmart and Shopko, the reasonable probability standard was satisfied. Id; DeJesus,
2017 UT 22, ¶ 40 (“in many lost evidence cases, there may be little extrinsic,
corroborating evidence. Defendants will likely never be able to fully establish exactly
what the evidence would have shown”); id. at ¶ 44 n. 62 (“It is the State’s duty to
preserve relevant evidence, and it cannot escape that duty”).
C.

The Culpability of the State in the Loss or Destruction of the Evidence

At Walmart in October of 2014, R 80, immediately after Ms. Rasmussen saw Mr.
Powell, she (and her friends or family who were with her) complained to Walmart
employees, and looked for a supervisor, a manager, or a security officer. R 415; R 431
(“I [Jennifer Holdaway] wanted to alert people – you know, alert the people at Walmart
so that something could be done”). Walmart told Mr. Powell to leave the store and they
escorted him out. R 417; R 434; cf. 442 (in Shopko, he just left the store). Jennifer
Holdaway reported the incident to law enforcement by email and through social media on
“the Facebook website of the West Valley PD.” R 447.
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The prosecution witnesses’ reporting of the incident to Shopko and Walmart was
undisputed. At the time, however, nothing was done at either store. Compare DeJesus,
2017 UT 22 at ¶ 48 (“it is very difficult, if not impossible, for this court to understand
why prison personnel would not, with full knowledge that a claimed assault had occurred
by an inmate against a guard, maintain a recording of that event”). Like the prison
personnel who failed to maintain a recording of that event in DeJesus, it is difficult, if not
impossible to understand in Mr. Powell’s situation why Walmart, with full knowledge
that a claimed exposure (or alleged lewd statutory violation) had occurred, would not
maintain a recording of that event. (Shopko did keep a recording, but the officer lost or
destroyed it after viewing the footage). But see Rule 23B, Steve Powell Affidavit
(Walmart security confronted him at the scene, determined there was no wrongdoing, and
let him go).
Like the surveillance system at the prison in DeJesus, the cameras and video at
Walmart were recording for a specific reason, with an emphasis on capturing any
wrongdoing for future litigation. Differences in opinion or contradictory perceptions
about what did or did not occur may be independently countered or objectively
corroborated by an unbiased video. See DeJesus, 2017 UT 22, ¶ 48 (“If the recording
showed exactly as [the Officer] said, certainly it would seem to this court that common
sense would indicate that recording would be retained . . . .”). The defendant cannot
maintain the surveillance footage for the store. Only the store or police can do so. Id. at
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¶ 44 n. 62 (“It is the State’s duty to preserve relevant evidence, and it cannot escape that
duty”); R 417 (no Walmart management ever followed up with the witnesses, nor did
Shopko management immediately do so [until contacted by police], even though the
prosecution witnesses had taken a picture of him covering himself up and Shopko had the
video at their disposal. R 421, 441).
In addition to the independent duty of the store to maintain the video – upon being
notified of the incident, with such a report occurring at both Walmart and Shopko, R 415,
431, 434 – the police may not similarly shirk a duty to investigate when the officer
knows, “They [stores] only keep it [video footage] for about 30 days.” R 458, 470
(Officer acknowledged that he “Might’ve been” able to obtain surveillance footage of the
Wal-Mart incident if he had started the investigation sooner). For the reporting of crimes,
the witnesses used Facebook (and other social media) to report the incident the very next
day to the police. R 422 (“The next day, my aunt and my stepmom emailed the police
department”).
Only the police department can control how they respond to the report of a crime
on their social media platform. Here, the involved officer did not actively investigate the
two store incidents until about nine or ten months after they had been reported. R 468-69.
Obtaining long delayed and untimely witness statements after such an extended period of
time was also directly attributable to police inaction. The witnesses’ faded memories and
their inability to recall a now dated perception of the incident would have been counter-
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balanced substantially with the store video surveillance footage.
The police additionally bear the burden for not having an immediate screening or
filtering process in how and when they respond to a citizen’s online report of a crime.
See Utah Code Ann. § 53-13-103(1)(a). Officers have a Facebook page on their police
website for the specific purpose of receiving and responding to a witness’ complaint
about a crime – but for the police to then do nothing with such incoming information
about a crime for nine or ten months is inexcusable. A citizen’s filed complaint about a
criminal offense on a law enforcement website carries a police need for immediate action
in a way dissimilar to a social media posting of a FYI memorable family event. As a
entity or officer “whose primary and principal duties consist of the prevention and
detection of crime and the enforcement of criminal statutes[,]” see id., some minimal
police investigation to preserve potential evidence for future use was required upon
receipt or almost immediately, given what the police know about the video retention
period. R 458 (where the officer acknowledged, “some businesses will hold on to
surveillance forever, and other businesses will hold on to it for like 48 hours or 72 hours.
Kind of the going rate is about 30 days”). Investigative efforts need not have been fully
completed in such a time period, but an initial quick police inquiry would have enabled
them to preserve the video. Given the proliferation of video, audio, and/or photographs
captured on the phones of witnesses, but not necessarily retained by them or a service
provider after extended durations (i.e. deletions or material is recorded over itself after 30
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days), substantial culpability rests with the State in the loss or destruction of the evidence
for not immediately acting within 30 days to preserve such vital evidence.
D.

The Prejudice to the Defendant as a Result of the Missing Evidence

In DeJesus, the high court agreed with the district court’s reluctance to accept the
officer’s blanket statement on what the video recording would have shown – had it not
been destroyed.
“If the recording showed exactly as [Officer] Hansen said, certainly it would seem
to this court that common sense would indicate that recording would be retained . .
. . The motivation, frankly, to destroy or fail to preserve such a recording would
come if the recording supported some other factual situation than the one [Officer]
Hansen describes.” Thus, there may have been some motivation by the State to
permit the footage to be recorded over and lost. Indeed, the court stated that “it is
very difficult, if not impossible, for this court to understand why prison personnel
would not, with full knowledge that a claimed assault had occurred by an inmate
against a guard, maintain a recording of that event.”
DeJesus, 2017 UT 22, ¶ 48.
The officer in DeJesus claimed that Lissette DeJesus “looked directly at [him] and
then kicked [him]” “in [the] lower . . . abdomen and . . . in [the] . . . right thigh.” Id. at ¶
8. The officer also testified that when he watched the surveillance footage immediately
after Ms. DeJesus had kicked him, the footage corroborated an intentional assault against
him and not an accidental kick that was intended for another inmate. The officer’s sworn
testimony was that her two kicks were purposefully directed at him and only him. Id. at ¶
11. Significantly, the officer’s testimony, which was believed by the jury, was not
enough to uphold the conviction nor did it deter the high court from reversing and
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ordering the district court on remand to dismiss the case. Id. at ¶ 54.
In Mr. Powell’s case, the officer’s loss or destruction of the video was more
egregious. Detective Jason Vincent did more than once view the surveillance video at
Shopko. He actually collected the video for repeated views and photographic extraction.
R 458 (“They [Shopko] pulled surveillance, and I was able to collect some of that”).
Indeed, the officer extracted still photographs from the video footage in preparation for
trial. The officer captured Mr. Powell at the precise time, in the same attire, and at the
very department in the store where he was accused of wrongdoing. See Exhibits 2 &3
(the exhibits are still photographs from the video). But the same officer simultaneously
and conveniently failed to retain the video in its entirety for presentation to the jury (or to
produce it before trial for examination by the defense). The officer selectively and
subjectively corroborated his own account of what was in the video, thus avoiding an
unbiased objective account through the video itself, which would have been a complete
and continuously filmed recording of Mr. Powell while he was in the store.
The officer’s lack of credibility is almost facially obvious, as he – a policeman
trained to observe wrongdoing – claimed that there “could’ve been, like, shoplifting
taking place” and he would not have noticed it during his examination of the video
because his sole purpose was watching the video to see if Mr. Powell had exposed
himself. R 483. His response was in the context of a jury question, which merely queried
the officer about the video depiction (as opposed to relying on the prosecution witnesses’
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testimony) as to whether the witnesses were close enough to Mr. Powell to get a good
look at how or if he was in fact exposed. The officer could have simply responded, I
didn’t preserve the video or I don’t recall. He similarly contended that he didn’t know the
approximate amount of minutes that he had observed Mr. Powell on surveillance video
(i.e. the amount of time and the number of angles from which the surveillance video
could have determined whether he was exposed or not), R 483-84 – which goes to the
heart of why the officer’s statements do not suffice nor can they substitute for the jury’s
ability to rely on the video itself. Compare DeJesus, 2017 UT 22, ¶ 48 (“The motivation,
frankly, to destroy or fail to preserve such a recording would come if the recording
supported some other factual situation than the one [the officer] describes. Thus, there
may have been some motivation by the State to permit the footage to be recorded over
and lost.”).
The officer’s loss or destruction of the Shopko video was thus more glaring than
the lost video in DeJesus (which warranted a dismissal). Aside from officer’s ability to
physically obtain the Shopko video at the onset of his investigation, the Walmart and
Shopko incidents were handled quite symmetrically by Anastasia Rasmussen and her
mother, Jennifer Holdaway (two of the prosecution witnesses). With little hesitation, the
witnesses reported the incidents and there was ample time for each and every store video
surveillance footage to be preserved.
The jurors, themselves, asked about the video as they wanted to know the amount
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of recorded footage time or the angles from which the video “would’ve showed whether
the defendant was exposed or not?” R 483-84. The questions posed by the jury occurred
after Anastasia Rasmussen and Jennifer Holdaway had already both testified. Not content
with the two prosecution witnesses’ prior and completed testimony, the jury asked the
investigating officer who had watched the video,“How many minutes approximately of
surveillance video from ShopKo were from an angle that would’ve showed whether the
defendant was exposed or not?” R 483-84. The jury’s questions reflected the importance
of the video and the prejudicial impact of the footage not being preserved to answer the
uncertainties lingering in the juror’s minds. DeJesus, 2017 UT 22, ¶ 53 (“The
surveillance footage would have changed the entire nature of the case, . . . Indeed, we
can conceive of no other evidence that would be as helpful or probative than an actual
video recording of the events. Nor can we think of other evidence that can serve as an
adequate replacement”).
The timing of the jury’s questions, which took place at the end of the State’s casein-chief or after its last witness had testified (third of three witnesses), R 484, equally
reflects that the prosecution witnesses’ testimony was not necessarily definitive nor
accepted at face value by the jury. At the point in time when the State was ending its
presentation of evidence, the jury still thought the video was important and that the
completed testimony had holes in it.
Following all of the State’s testimonial presentation, the jurors continued to ask
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about how long the video was or wouldn’t the video have shown whether the defendant
was exposed. R 484. Even after they heard the officer testify about Mr. Powell’s
purported admissions (albeit distinguished on cross-examination as referring to his thrill
seeking incidents in the past), the jury continued to probe for more evidentiary details or
independent corroboration from the video itself. R 484.
In another note to the court, the jurors asked a question that each store video
surveillance footage would have been able to answer: “Distance [of witnesses] to
defendant when penis viewed at Wal-Mart and ShopKo, one of these was from behind
him, clarify, including distance.” R 451. The jurors’ question was at the close of the
testimony by Jennifer Holdaway, the only other eyewitness at the scene. Hence, the
second of two witnesses had both claimed to have seen his penis, but the jurors’ note
indicated that they were still questioning whether to believe them or the extent of the
exposure. The note was not just for a single store incident, it addressed the witness’
viewing of the penis at both Wal-Mart and ShopKo. The jurors’ note twice referred to
“distance,” which is often a key factor in determining the level of certainty or the
likelihood of being (in)correct in any identification process. See MUJI CR404(1)(c)
Eyewitness Identification [Long instruction] (“Many factors affect the accuracy of
identification . . . you should consider . . . the distance between the witness and that
person”).
Thus, while the prosecution witness’ testimonial identification and claimed
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certainty in seeing that Mr. Powell had exposed himself should have been enough, the
jurors’ note twice asked about distance. Ms. Rasmussen said, “I was within arm’s reach”
when she came up from behind him, R 446, yet the jurors’ note wanted objective
confirmation through the video.
The video from both stores would have given the jurors the answers to their
questions for both occasions. For each store, the video also would have objectively
shown the distance between the parties during their time in the store (for identification
accuracy), the involved angles for viewing, and a host of other factors including whether
or not he was exposed. Id. (most of the factors set forth in the entire Long instruction
would have been covered by the video footage from both Wal-Mart and ShopKo). Prior
counsel performed ineffectively and prejudicially in not moving to dismiss the case.
DeJesus, 2017 UT 22, ¶ 54 (“given the indisputably central role a video recording of the
incident would play, we cannot say that the loss of the evidence had only a negligible
impact on Ms. DeJesus’s right to a fundamentally fair trial”).
Mr. Powell disputes the detective’s subjective interpretations as to what the officer
believed Mr. Powell’s meant to say or how Powell’s statements were interpreted or
perceived by the officer. The officer’s interview with Steve Powell was not recorded, nor
were Miranda protections extended to him. In order to address such issues, his Rule 23B
motion, memorandum, and affidavit were separately filed for this Court’s consideration.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Powell respectfully requests this Court to hold that prior counsel was
ineffective in not moving to dismiss his case based on the State’s due process violation
for losing or destroying critical video store surveillance footage. Alternatively, counsel
performed ineffectively in not moving to dismiss the matter based on governing case law
concerning the sufficiency of the evidence, particularly the lascivious type of mens rea
requirement that was lacking in the case at bar. In addition, counsel should have objected
to the flawed jury instructions on the incorrectly listed elements of the offense, which
necessitates a new trial.
DATED this 8th day of February, 2019.
/s/ Ronald Fujino
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

State of Utah,

JURY INSTRUCTIONS

Plaintiff,

Case No. 151913515

Steven Norman Powell,
Defendant

. This Jury is hereby charged with the law that arplies to this case in the
following instructions, numbered
\ through 2inclusive.

~~
Dated this ___ day of _ _ _...:;..;;;._""'"7f:(J'I

Honorab
S. Kouris
Third District Court

00180

Instruction No. _I_

Members of the jury, you now have all the evidence. Three things remain to
be done: First, I will give you additional instructions that you will follow in deciding
this case. Second, the lawyers will give their closing arguments. The prosecutor will
go first, then the defense. Because the prosecution has the burden of proof, the
prosecutor may give a rebuttal. Finally, you will go to the jury room to discuss and
decide the case.

00181

Instruction No. -1'.:__

As jurors you will decide whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty; You
must base your decision only on the evidence. Evidence usually consists of the
testimony and exhibits presented at trial. Testimony is what witnesses say under
oath. Exhibits are things like documents, photographs, or other physical objects. The
fact that the defendant has been accused of a crime and brought to trial is not
evidence. What the lawyers say is not evidence. For example, their opening
statements and closing arguments are not evidence.

00182

Instruction No. ..2_
When the lawyers give their closing arguments, keep in mind that they are
advocating their views of the case. What they say during their closing arguments is
not evidence. If the lawyers say anything about the evidence that conflicts with what
you remember, you are to rely on your memory of the evidence. If they say anything
about the law that conflicts with these instructions, you are to rely on these
instructions.

00183

Instruction No._±_

As the judge, I am neutral. If I have said or done anything that makes you
think I favor one side or the other, that was not my intention. D.o pot interpret
anything I have done as indicating that I have any particular view of the evidence or
the decision you should reach.

00184

Instruction No. _2_

Remember, the fact that the defendant is charged with a crime is not
evidence of guilt. The law presumes that the defendant is not guilty of the crime(s)
charged. This presumption persists unless the prosecution's evidence convinces you
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty.

00185

Instruction No . ...!:t_

The prosecution has the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Some of you may have served as jurors in civil cases, where you
were told that it is only necessary to prove that a fact is more likely true than not
true. In criminal cases, the prosecution's proof must be more powerful than that. It
must be beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that
leaves you firmly convinced of the defendant's guilt. There are very few things in
this world that we know with absolute certainty, and in criminal cases the law does
not require proof that overcomes every possible doubt. If, based on your
consideration of the evidence, you are firmly convinced that the defendant is guilty
of the crime charged, you must find him/her guilty. If, on the other hand, you think
there is a real possibility that he/she.is not guilty, you must give him/her the benefit
of the doubt and find him/her not guilty.

00186

Instruction No. _3:_

Facts may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. The law does not
treat one type of evidence as better than the other. Direct evidence can prove a fact
by itself. It usually comes from a witness who perceived firsthand the fact in
question. For example, if a witness testified he looked outside and saw it was
raining, that would be direct evidence that it had rained. Circumstantial evidence is
indirect evidence. It usually comes from a witness who perceived a set of related
events, but not the fact in question. However, based on that testimony someone
could conclude that the fact in question had occurred. For example, if a witness
testified that she looked outside and saw that the ground was wet and people were
closing their umbrellas, that would be circumstantial evidence that it had rained.
Before you can find the defendant guilty of any charge, there must be enough
evidence - direct, circumstantial, or some of both - to convince you of the
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It is up to you to decide.
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Instruction No._!_

In deciding this case you will need to decide how believable each witness
was. Use your judgment and common sense. Let me suggest a few things to think
about as you weigh each witness's testimony:
• How good was the witness's opportunity to see, hear, or otherwise observe what
the witness testified about?
• Does the witness have something to gain or lose from this case?
• Does the witness have any connection to the people involved in this case?
• Does the witness have any reason to lie or slant the testimony?
• Was the witness's testimony consistent over time? If not, is there a good reason
for the inconsistency? If the witness was inconsistent, was it about something
important or unimportant?
• How believable was the witness's testimony in light of other evidence presented
at trial?
• How believable was the witness's testimony in light of human experience?
• Was there anything about the way the witness testified that made the testimony
more or less believable?
In deciding whether or not to believe a witness, you may also consider
anything else you think is important.
You do not have to believe everything that a witness said. You may believe
part and disbelieve the rest. On the other hand, if you are convinced that a witness
lied, you may disbelieve anything the witness said. In other words, you may believe
all, part, or none of a witness's testimony. You may believe many witnesses against
one or one witness against many.
In deciding whether a witness testified truthfully, remember that no one's
memory is perfect. Anyone can make an honest mistake. Honest people may
remember the same event differently.

00188

Instruction No . ..,1__
You have heard the testimony of a law enforcement officer. The fact that a
witness is employed in law enforcement does not mean that his/her testimony
deserves more or less consideration than that of any other witness. It is up to you to
give any witness's testimony whatever weight you think it deserves.

00189

Instruction No.~

A person accused of a crime may choose whether or not to testify. In this case
the defendant chose not to testify. Do not hold that choice against the defendant. Do
not try to guess why the defendant chose not to testify. Do not consider it in your
deliberations. Decide the case only on the basis of the evidence. The defendant does
not have to prove that he or she is not guilty. The prosecution must prove the
defendant's guilt beyond a reason.able doubt.

00190

Instruction No._\_\_

A person cannot be found guilty of a criminal offense unless that person's
conduct is prohibited by law, AND at the time the conduct occurred, the defendant
demonstrated a particular mental state specified by law. "Conduct" can mean both
an "act" OR the failure to act when the law requires a person to act. An "aet" is a
voluntary movement of the body and it can include speech. As to the "mental state"
requirement, the prosecution must prove that at the time the defendant acted,
he/she did so with a particular mental state. For each offense, the law defines what
kind of mental state the defendant had to have, if any. For some crimes the
defendant must have acted "intentionally" or "knowingly." For other crimes it is
enough that the defendant acted "recklessly," with "criminal negligence," or with
some other specified mental state. Later I will instruct you on the specific conduct
and mental state that the. prosecution must prove before the defendant can be found
guilty of the crime(s) charged.
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Instruction No. \1'

The law requires that the prosecutor prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant acted with a particular mental state. Ordinarily, there is no way that a
defendant's mental state can be proved directly, because no one can tell what
another person is thinking. A defendant's mental state can be proved indirectly from
the surrounding facts and circumstances. This includes things like what the
defendant said, what the defendant did, and any other .evidence that shows what
'

was in the defendant's mind.
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Instruction No. _!?__
A person acts "intentionally" or "with intent" when it is his/her conscious
objective is to engage in a certain conduct or cause a certain result
A person acts "knowingly" or "with knowledge" when the person is aware
that his/her conduct is reasonably certain to cause a particular result.
A person acts "recklessly" when he/she is aware of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that certain circumstances exist relating to his/her conduct,
consciously disregards the risk, and acts anyway. The nature and extent of the risk
must be of such a magnitude that disregarding it is a gross deviation from what an
ordinary person would do in that situation.
A person acts with criminal negligence when he/she should be aware that
his/her conduct creates a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a particular result
will occur. The nature and extent of the risk must be of such a magnitude that failing
to perceive it is a gross deviation from what an ordinary person would perceive in
that situation.
The concepts of "recklessness" and "criminal negligence" are similar in that
both require the presence of a substantial and unjustifiable risk. They differ in that it
is reckless to act if one is aware of the risk, while it is criminally negligent to act if
one should be aware of the risk. In either event, the behavior must be a gross
deviation from what an ordinary person would do under the same circumstances.
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Instruction No .

.!±__

The defendant has been charged with more than one crime. It is your duty to
consider each charge separately. For each crime charged, consider all of the
evidence related to that charge. Decide whether the prosecution has presented
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of that particular
crime. Your verdict on one charge does not determine your verdict on any other
charge.
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Instruction No. ~
In making your decision, do not consider what punishment could result ftom
a verdict of guilty. Your duty is to decide if the defendant is guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Punishment is not relevant to whether the defendant is guilty or
not guilty.

00195

Unless these instructions ;give a .de:finitiot:1, you should give all words their
· usual and 9,rdt-na.Ty :rneanfog.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

\~

"Any other act of lewdness" includes acts of the same general kind, class, character, or nature as
the enumerated conduct of public intercourse, sodomy, exposure of the genitals or buttocks, or
masturbation.

"Sodomy" includes any sexual act involving the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of
another person, regardless of the sex of either participant.
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INSTRUCTION NO. \"
STEVEN NORMAN POWELL is charged in Countsl with Lewdness occurring between
October 1, 2014 through October 31, 2014. You cannot convict him of this offense unless, based
on the evidence, you find beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements:
1. STEVEN NORMAN POWELL;
2. Intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly performed any of the following acts:
a. An act of sexual intercourse or sodomy;
b. Exposed his genitals, buttocks, anus, or his pubic area;
c. Masturbated; or
d. Any other act of lewdness
3. And did so
a. In a public place or
b. Under circumstances which the defendant should have known would likely cause
affront or alarm to another 14 years of age or older.
After you carefully consider all of the evidence in this case, if you are convinced that each and
every element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant
GUILTY. On the other hand, if you are not convinced that each and every element has been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant NOT GUILTY.
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INSTRUCTION NO.
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STEVEN NORMAN POWELL is charged in Count 2 with Lewdness occurring on November
28, 2014. You cannot convict him of this offense unless, based on the evidence, you find beyond
a reasonable doubt each of the following elements:
4. STEVEN NORMAN POWELL;
5. Intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly performed any of the following acts:
a. An act of sexual intercourse or sodomy;
b. Exposed his genitals, buttocks, anus, or his pubic area;
c. Masturbated; or
d. Any other act of lewdness
6. And did so
a. In a public place or
b. Under circumstances which the defendant should have known would likely cause
affront or alarm to another 14 years of age or older.
After you carefully consider all of the evidence in this case, if you are convinced that each and
every element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant
GUILTY. On the other hand, if you are not convinced that each and every element has been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant NOT GUILTY.
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Instruction No.~

In the jury room, discuss the evidence and speak your minds with each other.
Open discussion should help you reach a unanimous agreement on a verdict. Listen
carefully and respectfully to each other's views and keep an open mind about what
others have to say. I recommend that you not commit yourselves to a particular
verdict before discussing all the evidence. Try to reach unanimous agreement, but
only if you can do so honestly and in good conscience. If there is a difference of
opinion about the evidence or the verdict, do not hesitate to change your mind if you
become convinced that your position is wrong. On the other hand, do not give up
your honestly held views about the evidence simply to agree on a verdict, to give in
to pressure from other jurors, or just to get the case over with. In the end, your vote
must be your own. Because this is a criminal case, every single juror must agree
with the verdict before the defendant can be found "guilty" or "not guilty." In·
reaching your verdict you may not use methods of chance, such as drawing straws
or flipping a coin. Rather, the verditt must reflect your individual, careful, and
conscientious judgment as to whether the evidence presented by the prosecutor
proved each charge beyond a reasonable doubt
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Instruction No. 3-_

Among the first things you should do when
you go to the jury room to
.:~
deliberate is to appoint someone to serve as the jury foreperson. The foreperson
should not dominate the jury's discussion, but rather should facilitate the discussion
of the evidence and make sure that all members of the jury get the chance to speak.
The foreperson's opinions should be given the same weight as those of other
members of the jury. Once the jury has reached a verdict, the foreperson is
responsible for filling out and signing the verdict form( s) on behalf of the entire
jury. For each offense, the verdict form will have two blanks-one for "guilty" and
the other for "not guilty." The foreperson will fill in the appropriate blank to reflect
the jury's unanimous decision. In filling out the form, the foreperson needs to make
sure that only one blank is marked for each charge.
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